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BACKGROUND
The benefits of pay-for-performance schemes in improving the quality of care re-
main uncertain. There is little information on the effect of removing incentives 
from existing pay-for-performance schemes.
METHODS
We conducted interrupted time-series analyses of electronic medical record (EMR) 
data from 2010 to 2017 for 12 quality-of-care indicators in the United Kingdom’s 
Quality and Outcomes Framework for which financial incentives were removed 
in 2014 and 6 indicators for which incentives were maintained. We estimated the 
effects of removing incentives on changes in performance on quality-of-care 
measures.
RESULTS
Complete longitudinal data were available for 2819 English primary care practices 
with more than 20 million registered patients. There were immediate reductions 
in documented quality of care for all 12 indicators in the first year after the re-
moval of financial incentives. Reductions were greatest for indicators related to 
health advice, with a reduction of 62.3 percentage points (95% confidence interval 
[CI], −65.6 to −59.0) in EMR documentation of lifestyle counseling for patients 
with hypertension. Changes were smaller for indicators involving clinical actions 
that automatically update the EMR, such as laboratory testing, with a reduction of 
10.7 percentage points (95% CI, −13.6 to −7.8) in control of cholesterol in patients 
with coronary heart disease and 12.1 percentage points (95% CI, −13.6 to −10.6) 
for thyroid-function testing in patients with hypothyroidism. There was little 
change in performance on the 6 quality measures for which incentives were 
maintained.
CONCLUSIONS
Removal of financial incentives was associated with an immediate decline in per-
formance on quality measures. In part, the decline probably reflected changes in 
EMR documentation, but declines on measures involving laboratory testing sug-
gest that incentive removal also changed the care delivered.
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Quality of Care in the United Kingdom
Pay-for-performance schemes are in-creasingly used by health care payers to support improvement in the quality of care 
and have become widespread in many health 
systems, including those in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Israel, 
Taiwan, Thailand, New Zealand, and Australia.1-3 
Despite widespread implementation, questions 
persist about the ability of these schemes to im-
prove the quality of care or patient outcomes,4-6 
and there is ongoing debate about the sustain-
ability of performance once financial incentives 
are removed.7-11
In 2004, the United Kingdom’s National Health 
Service (NHS) implemented the Quality and Out-
comes Framework (QOF). At the time, the QOF 
was the world’s largest pay-for-performance 
health care scheme, accounting for around 25% 
of the income of family practices in the United 
Kingdom.12,13 The number of quality-of-care indi-
cators and the proportion of income dependent 
on pay for performance have been reduced over 
time. Scotland abolished the QOF altogether in 
2016, and reductions in the scope of the QOF in 
England seem likely. The benefits and limita-
tions of the QOF and other pay-for-performance 
schemes have been extensively discussed, includ-
ing the premise that pay for performance is likely 
to work best when aligned with other improve-
ment efforts such as public reporting.6,12,14-17 How-
ever, little is known about the effects of remov-
ing pay-for-performance incentives, and the few 
studies in this area have had conflicting re-
sults.8-11,18 There is therefore considerable uncer-
tainty about whether any gain from pay for per-
formance is sustained once financial incentives 
are removed. It is plausible that incentivized care 
becomes so standard and routine that the con-
tinued use of financial incentives is unnecessary, 
but it is equally plausible that any performance 
gains associated with pay-for-performance 
schemes are dependent on continued payment.8
As part of a regular review of the QOF, finan-
cial incentives were removed from 40 of the 121 
quality-of-care indicators at the end of March 
2014 (the end of the 2013–2014 fiscal year). In-
centive payments were instead used to increase 
capitation payments in all practices. However, 
performance data for a number of these indica-
tors continued to be collected and made publicly 
available (although without meaningful public 
reporting) at the individual-practice level as part 
of the Indicators No Longer in QOF (INLIQ) 
data set. The aim of this study was to examine 
the effect of the removal of financial incentives 
for these indicators on overall documented qual-
ity of care, variation between practices, and dif-
ferences in quality between practices serving 
more affluent areas and those serving less afflu-
ent areas.
Me thods
Study Design
The design was an interrupted time-series analy-
sis of observational data for 12 quality-of-care 
indicators for which incentives were removed 
and 6 indicators for which incentives were main-
tained. Methods are briefly described here, with 
complete details provided in the Supplementary 
Appendix, available with the full text of this ar-
ticle at NEJM.org. The study did not require 
formal ethical review because it involved analy-
sis of only publicly available practice-level data 
that do not identify individuals.
Data Sources
The QOF indicators and the INLIQ are defined 
nationally by NHS Digital and are extracted 
automatically from the electronic medical records 
(EMRs) of English family practices annually.19 
We defined the socioeconomic status of the 
population served by each practice using the 
2015 English Index of Multiple Deprivation score 
for the area where the practice was located.20
Indicator Selection and Definition
The primary outcomes examined were 12 quality-
of-care indicators for which financial incen-
tives were removed at the end of March 2014. 
For these 12 indicators, the INLIQ database in-
cluded a minimum of three annual measure-
ments before and three after removal. (Three 
measurements are the minimum required for 
time-series analysis.21) There were no major 
changes in the definitions of these 12 indicators 
(Table 1, and Tables S1 and S2 in the Supple-
mentary Appendix). We defined performance as 
the percentage of patients on the relevant disease 
register who were not excluded by automatic 
criteria such as recent practice registration and 
who received the specified care. The indicators 
that we were able to include covered a range of 
clinical processes and intermediate outcomes 
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Indicator Indicator Type
Period with 
Incentives
Maximum 
Payment per 
Average-Size 
Practice  
(U.S. Dollars)†
Median No. of 
Patients Eligible for 
Care per Practice 
(IQR)‡
Incentives removed
Smoking status documented in all adults Clinical process 2010–2011 to 
2013–2014
£1,726
($2,313)
5260 (3293–7992)
Diabetes retinopathy screening documented Clinical process 2010–2011 to 
2013–2014
£785
($1,051)
319 (205–474)
Glycated hemoglobin testing documented in patients with  
serious mental illness§
Clinical process 2011–2012 to 
2013–2014
£785
($1,051)
29 (17–46)
Body-mass index documented in patients with serious mental 
illness§
Clinical process 2011–2012 to 
2013–2014
£628
($841)
47 (29–76)
Thyroid function tested in patients with hypothyroidism Clinical process 2010–2011 to 
2013–2014
£942
($1,262)
192 (110–308)
Cholesterol tested in patients with stroke or TIA Clinical process 2010–2011 to 
2013–2014
£314
($421)
98 (51–164)
Cholesterol controlled in patients with stroke or TIA Intermediate  
outcome
2010–2011 to 
2013–2014
£785
($1,051)
62 (30–109)
Cholesterol controlled in patients with CHD Intermediate  
outcome
2010–2011 to 
2013–2014
£2,668
($3,575)
190 (106–306)
Patients with epilepsy documented as being seizure-free Intermediate  
outcome
2010–2011 to 
2013–2014
£942
($1,262)
36 (21–58)
Lifestyle advice documented in patients with hypertension Health advice 2010–2011 to 
2013–2014
£1,569
($2,103)
178 (111–275)
Preconception advice documented in patients with  
epilepsy
Health advice 2011–2012 to 
2013–2014
£471
($631)
9 (5–15)
Advice about using long-acting, reversible contraceptives  
documented
Health advice 2010–2011 to 
2013–2014
£471
($631)
333 (187–553)
Incentives maintained
Blood pressure documented in patients with serious mental 
illness§
Clinical process 2011–2012 to 
2016–2017
£628
($841)
47 (28–74)
Alcohol consumption documented in patients with serious 
mental illness§
Clinical process 2011–2012 to 
2016–2017
£628
($841)
47 (28–74)
Cholesterol controlled in patients with diabetes Intermediate  
outcome
2010–2011 to 
2016–2017
£942
($1,262)
327 (203–492)
Blood pressure controlled in patients with CHD Intermediate  
outcome
2010–2011 to 
2016–2017
£2,668
($3,575)
206 (116–335)
Blood pressure controlled in patients with stroke or TIA Intermediate  
outcome
2010–2011 to 
2016–2017
£785
($1,051)
108 (55–179)
Smoking-cessation advice documented in smokers with 
chronic conditions¶
Health advice 2010–2011 to 
2016–2017
£3,923
($5,257)
223 (138–349)
*  CHD denotes coronary heart disease, IQR interquartile range, and TIA transient ischemic attack.
†  Shown is the maximum payment in 2013–2014 for a practice with an average number of registered patients (6911), typically with approxi-
mately three to four full-time-equivalent physicians, and an average prevalence of each condition. U.S. dollar amounts are based on the 
 exchange rate in December 2017.
‡  The median number of patients and IQR per practice are shown for the 2013–2014 period for practices included in the main analysis (total 
number of practices, depending on the indicator, 2723 to 2819 for indicators with incentives that were removed and 7187 to 7230 for indi-
cators with incentives that were maintained).
§  Serious mental illness was defined as schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, or another psychotic disorder.
¶  Chronic conditions included coronary heart disease, peripheral arterial disease, stroke or TIA, hypertension, diabetes, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, chronic kidney disease, asthma, and serious mental illness.
Table 1. Quality-of-Care Indicators Included in the Analysis.*
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for diabetes, coronary heart disease (CHD), stroke 
or transient ischemic attack (TIA), epilepsy, hypo-
thyroidism, and serious mental illness, as well 
as health-advice indicators (Table 1, and Table 
S1 in the Supplementary Appendix). For com-
parison, we examined changes in performance 
with respect to 6 QOF indicators for which in-
centives were maintained over the entire period 
of analysis, selected to cover the same processes, 
intermediate outcomes, and health advice as 
those for diabetes, CHD, stroke or TIA, serious 
mental illness, and smoking. The purpose of this 
comparison was to evaluate whether any ob-
served changes in documented quality for indi-
cators with incentives that were removed could 
have been due to other events, such as minor 
changes in indicator definitions over time and 
recent increases in workload pressure on family 
doctors in the United Kingdom (Tables S2 and 
S3 in the Supplementary Appendix).22
Statistical Analysis
We checked the validity of the data and plotted 
the time series to confirm assumptions of linear-
ity before and after the removal of financial incen-
tives. For the primary analysis, we used segment-
ed regression of interrupted time-series data to 
examine changes in the quality of care that were 
associated with the removal of incentives at the 
end of fiscal year 2013–2014. Depending on when 
the indicators were introduced, there were either 
three or four time points before 2013–2014. We 
used the method recommended by the Cochrane 
Effective Practice and Organisation of Care 
group for short time series.21 INLIQ data sub-
mission was strongly encouraged, but there were 
no specific penalties for not submitting data.
Practices were included in the primary time-
series analysis of indicators with incentives re-
moved if the practices reported data in each of 
the years examined. The main analysis of incen-
tive removal included data from 2723 to 2819 
practices (totaling >20 million registered pa-
tients and constituting approximately one third 
of all English practices), depending on the indi-
cator examined (Table S4 in the Supplementary 
Appendix). We also carried out a sensitivity 
analysis of incentive removal that included data 
from all practices submitting data at any time 
point. The sensitivity analysis included a maxi-
mum of 8245 practices in 2010–2011 and a mini-
mum of 4223 practices in 2014–2015. The analy-
sis of indicators for which incentives were 
maintained included data from all practices 
submitting QOF data, which fell from 8245 prac-
tices in 2010–2011 to 7291 in 2013–2014, mainly 
because of practice mergers. Full model results 
are presented in Tables S5 and S6 in the Supple-
mentary Appendix. The focus of this report is on 
the estimated change in quality-of-care perfor-
mance 1 year and 3 years after 2013–2014, as 
compared with the performance expected on the 
basis of trends before incentive removal.
To examine whether variation between prac-
tices changed after the removal of incentives, we 
constructed box plots of practice-level quality 
and evaluated differences in variance between 
2013–2014 (the year before removal) and 2016–
2017 (3 years after removal), using the Brown–
Forsythe test.23 To examine whether incentive 
removal differentially affected the performance 
of practices serving the most affluent and least 
affluent populations, we used segmented regres-
sion analysis to examine changes associated with 
incentive removal according to the level of afflu-
ence in the area served, comparing the mean 
quality in the quintile of practices serving the 
most affluent areas with the mean quality in the 
quintile serving the least aff luent areas. All 
analyses were carried out with SPSS software, 
version 22.
R esult s
Changes in Quality-of-Care Indicators  
after Incentive Removal
Before the removal of financial incentives, the 
documented quality of care was significantly 
increasing for 4 of the 12 indicators (glycated 
hemoglobin testing in patients with serious 
mental illness, cholesterol control in patients with 
stroke or TIA, lifestyle counseling for patients 
with hypertension, and preconception advice for 
patients with epilepsy) and was significantly de-
creasing for 2 indicators (thyroid-function testing 
in patients with hypothyroidism and cholesterol 
testing in patients with stroke or TIA), although 
absolute changes from year to year were small. 
As compared with expected values on the basis 
of previous trends, there were significant, moder-
ate-to-large reductions in documented quality for 
all 12 indicators in the year after incentives were 
The New England Journal of Medicine 
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removed, with small, mainly negative changes in 
trend in subsequent years (Fig. 1, and Table S5 
and Fig. S2 in the Supplementary Appendix).
Reductions in the documented quality of care 
the year after removal of financial incentives, as 
compared with the quality that would be ex-
pected on the basis of previous trends, ranged 
from 5.8 percentage points (95% confidence in-
terval [CI], −8.9 to −2.7) for documentation of 
smoking status to 62.3 percentage points (95% 
CI, −65.6 to −59.0) for documentation of lifestyle 
counseling in patients with hypertension (Table 2). 
Three years after removal of the incentives, there 
were still significant reductions in documented 
quality for all 12 indicators, with the largest re-
ductions in 2 of the 3 health-advice indicators 
(−71.6 percentage points for lifestyle counseling 
for patients with hypertension and −65.9 percent-
age points for preconception advice for patients 
with epilepsy) and in 1 of the intermediate-out-
come measures (−53.6 percentage points for docu-
mentation of seizure-free status in patients with 
epilepsy). Reductions in clinical-process measures 
were generally smaller, ranging from a reduction 
of 9.2 percentage points for thyroid-function 
testing in patients with hypothyroidism to a re-
duction of 37.5 percentage points for glycated 
hemoglobin testing in patients with serious 
mental illness, with similar reductions for inter-
mediate clinical outcomes (apart from documen-
tation of freedom from seizures in patients with 
epilepsy), ranging from a reduction of 10.1 per-
centage points for cholesterol control in patients 
with CHD to a reduction of 16.8 percentage 
points for cholesterol control in patients with 
stroke or TIA.
In contrast, analysis of the six indicators for 
which incentives were maintained showed no 
changes in documented quality 3 years after 
2013–2014 for four indicators (blood-pressure 
measurement in patients with serious mental 
illness, documentation of alcohol consumption 
in patients with serious mental illness, cholesterol 
control in patients with diabetes, and documen-
tation of advice regarding smoking cessation in 
patients with chronic illness), with significant 
but small absolute decreases of 1.4 percentage 
points (95% CI, −2.5 to −0.3) and 2.4 percentage 
points (95% CI, −3.5 to −1.3) for blood-pressure 
control in patients with CHD and in patients 
with stroke or TIA, respectively (Table 2 and 
Fig. 1). The results of a sensitivity analysis that 
included data from all practices at every time 
point were consistent with the results of the 
primary analysis of practices with complete data 
(Fig. S3 and Tables S6 and S7 in the Supplemen-
tary Appendix).
Differences in Effects of Incentive Removal 
among Practices
Variation among practices increased for 7 of the 
indicators for which incentives were removed 
(Fig. S4 and Table S8 in the Supplementary Ap-
pendix), was unchanged for cholesterol control 
in patients with stroke or TIA and thyroid-func-
tion testing in patients with hypothyroidism, and 
decreased for documentation of preconception 
advice given to patients with epilepsy and docu-
mentation of seizure-free status in patients with 
epilepsy (reflecting that the majority of practices 
ceased all documentation of these indicators). At 
baseline, performance on 6 of the 12 indicators 
was significantly better in the most affluent areas 
and performance on 2 of the indicators was 
significantly better in the least aff luent areas. 
Absolute differences were generally small, al-
though the three largest baseline differences 
favored the most affluent areas (4.9 percentage 
points for diabetic retinopathy screening, 7.4 per-
centage points for glycated hemoglobin testing 
in patients with serious mental illness, and 16.6 
percentage points for documentation of seizure-
free status in patients with epilepsy). After re-
moval of the financial incentives, there were 
significant changes in differences between prac-
tices serving the most affluent areas and those 
Figure 1. Documented Quality of Care for Indicators 
with Financial Incentives That Were Either Removed  
or Maintained at the End of 2013–2014.
Shown are the percentages of patients in whom quality-
of-care indicators were documented during the period 
from 2010–2011 to 2016–2017. Indicators for which in-
centives were removed are shown in Panels A, C, and E; 
the vertical red lines indicate the year of removal. Indi-
cators for which incentives were maintained are shown 
in Panels B, D, and F. Panels A and B show clinical-
process indicators, Panels C and D show intermediate-
outcome indicators, and Panels E and F show health-
advice indicators. CHD denotes coronary heart disease, 
and TIA transient ischemic attack.
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C Intermediate-Outcome Indicators, Incentives Removed D Intermediate-Outcome Indicators, Incentives Maintained
E Health-Advice Indicators, Incentives Removed F Health-Advice Indicators, Incentives Maintained
Thyroid function tested in patients with hypothyroidism
Smoking status documented in all adults
Diabetes retinopathy screening documented
Cholesterol tested in patients with stroke or TIA
Body-mass index documented in patients with serious mental illness
Glycated hemoglobin tested in patients with serious mental illness
Cholesterol controlled in patients with CHD
Cholesterol controlled in patients with stroke or TIA
Patients with epilepsy documented as being seizure-free
Long-acting, reversible
contraception advice
Lifestyle counseling in patients
with hypertension
Preconception advice
in patients with epilepsy
Blood pressure documented in patients with serious 
mental illness
Alcohol consumption documented in patients with
serious mental illness
Smoking-cessation advice documented in smokers
with chronic conditions
Blood pressure controlled in patients with CHD
Blood pressure controlled in patients with stroke or TIA
Cholesterol controlled in patients with diabetes
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serving the least affluent for 7 indicators: 2 fa-
voring the most affluent areas and 5 favoring the 
least affluent areas (Fig. S5, S6, and S7 and Table 
S9 in the Supplementary Appendix).
Discussion
Our analysis of information documented in EMRs 
showed that there were immediate reductions in 
quality-of-care measures for all 12 indicators in 
the first year after the removal of financial in-
centives, with only small additional changes in 
the following 2 years. Reductions were generally 
largest for indicators related to documented 
provision of health advice (Table 1), with abso-
lute reductions ranging from 46.1 to 71.6 per-
centage points 3 years after removal of financial 
incentives, and for the indicator related to docu-
Indicator
Patients Receiving 
Indicated Care before 
Incentive Removal*
Absolute Change in Expected Trend  
after Incentive Removal
1 Yr after Removal 3 Yr after Removal
% of patients (95% CI) percentage points (95% CI)
Incentives removed
Smoking status documented in all adults 85.5 (85.5 to 85.5) −5.8 (−8.9 to −2.7) −11.7 (−16.3 to −7.1)
Diabetes retinopathy screening documented 82.6 (82.5 to 82.6) −11.5 (−16.7 to −6.3) −14.9 (−22.7 to −7.1)
Glycated hemoglobin tested in patients with serious  
mental illness
75.8 (75.5 to 76.1) −28.5 (−39.0 to −18.0) −37.5 (−55.4 to −19.6)
Body-mass index documented in patients with serious 
mental illness
80.1 (79.9 to 80.3) −30.2 (−35.5 to −24.9) −29.9 (−38.9 to −20.9)
Thyroid function tested in patients with hypothyroidism 93.5 (93.5 to 93.6) −12.1 (−13.6 to −10.6) −9.2 (−11.4 to −7.0)
Cholesterol tested in patients with stroke or TIA 85.2 (85.1 to 85.3) −19.8 (−22.4 to −17.2) −18.0 (−21.8 to −14.2)
Cholesterol controlled in patients with stroke or TIA 69.1 (68.9 to 69.3) −15.9 (−17.1 to −14.7) −16.8 (−18.0 to −15.0)
Cholesterol controlled in patients with CHD 74.1 (74.0 to 74.2) −10.7 (−13.6 to −7.8) −10.1 (−14.3 to −5.9)
Patients with epilepsy documented as being seizure-free 61.7 (61.4 to 62.0) −48.7 (−51.8 to −45.6) −53.6 (−58.2 to −49.0)
Lifestyle counseling documented in patients with hyper-
tension
80.1 (80.0 to 80.2) −62.3 (−65.6 to −59.0) −71.6 (−76.5 to −66.7)
Preconception advice documented in patients with  
epilepsy
64.9 (64.3 to 65.4) −60.5 (−63.5 to −57.5) −65.9 (−71.0 to −60.8)†
Advice about using long-acting, reversible contraceptives 
documented
88.2 (88.1 to 88.3) −36.6 (−39.9 to −33.3) −46.1 (−51.8 to −45.6)
Incentives maintained‡
Blood pressure documented in patients with serious  
mental illness
83.0 (82.9 to 83.1) −1.5 (−5.4 to 2.4) 0.2 (−6.5 to 6.9)
Alcohol consumption documented in patients with  
serious mental illness
79.1 (79.0 to 79.2) 0.3 (−6.9 to 7.5) 1.5 (−10.7 to 13.7)
Cholesterol controlled in patients with diabetes 72.3 (72.3 to 72.4) −0.4 (−0.8 to 0.05) 0.0 (−0.7 to 0.7)
Blood pressure controlled in patients with CHD 88.9 (88.8 to 88.9) −0.8 (−1.6 to −0.04) −1.4 (−2.5 to −0.3)
Blood pressure controlled in patients with stroke or TIA 85.6 (85.6 to 85.6) −1.7 (−2.5 to −0.9) −2.4 (−3.5 to −1.3)
Smoking-cessation advice documented in smokers with 
chronic conditions
93.2 (93.2 to 93.2) 0.6 (−0.2 to 1.4) 0.9 (−0.2 to 2.0)
*  Values are population means for the year before incentive removal.
†  The estimated reduction is greater than the value in the year before incentive removal because there was a small upward trend in this indi-
cator before incentive removal, so the expected value 3 years after removal was slightly larger.
‡  In the analysis of indicators for which incentives were maintained, we examined whether there was a change in performance after an assumed 
interruption on the date of incentive removal for other indicators (at the end of 2013–2014).
Table 2. Changes in Documented Quality of Care According to Whether Incentives Were Removed or Maintained.
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mentation of seizure-free status in patients with 
epilepsy, with an absolute reduction of 53.6 
percentage points (Table 2). These were indica-
tors for which the physician was required to 
check boxes in the EMR to indicate that care 
had been delivered, and the large reductions 
observed could indicate either that care was no 
longer given or that it was no longer docu-
mented. Changes were smaller, although still 
substantial, for performance on clinical-pro-
cess and intermediate-outcome indicators, for 
which data such as blood pressure and smok-
ing status are routinely recorded in coded form 
and laboratory test values are automatically 
entered into the EMR. The smallest change in 
performance at 3 years was a reduction of 9.2 
percentage points in thyroid-function testing 
in patients with hypothyroidism. There were no 
large changes in documented quality on indi-
cators for which incentives were not removed. 
Removal of incentives was usually associated 
with increased variation in documented quality 
among practices, but socioeconomic disparities 
narrowed rather than widened after incentive 
removal.
Five previous studies of financial-incentive re-
moval in health care had conflicting results.8-11,18 
One study showed that incentive removal had 
little effect on documented quality for eight QOF 
indicators, but seven of them were process indi-
cators (e.g., measurement of blood pressure) for 
which linked outcome indicators continued to 
incentivize measurement.9 Similarly, performance 
was sustained after incentive removal for six of 
seven measures of quality of care in 128 Veter-
ans Health Administration (VA) hospitals in the 
United States10 and for nine primary care pre-
scribing-safety indicators in the United Kingdom.18 
However, in both cases, financial incentives 
were part of more comprehensive improvement 
interventions, including blends of goal setting, 
comparative feedback, facilitation, and education. 
In contrast, there were reductions in diabetic 
retinopathy screening (by approximately 8%) 
and cervical cancer screening (by approximate-
ly 4%) after incentive removal in 35 Kaiser 
Permanente facilities, although the reductions 
occurred gradually over a period of several years 
rather than abruptly.8 Similarly, quality declined 
after incentive removal in VA facilities participat-
ing in a randomized, controlled trial of incen-
tives to improve hypertension control.11 In both 
cases, reductions after removal of the incentives 
were similar to gains associated with the intro-
duction of the incentives.
Our study also showed moderate reductions 
in documented clinical-process and outcome 
quality, which were of a scale similar to that of 
observed increases in documented quality when 
the QOF was introduced.12,24 However, we ob-
served much larger reductions in clinical-process 
documentation in patients with serious mental 
illness, in documentation of whether patients 
with epilepsy were seizure-free, and in docu-
mentation of health advice. Further research is 
needed to examine the reasons for these larger 
reductions. One possible explanation is that most 
practices do not offer nurse-led clinics for the 
management of serious mental illness or epi-
lepsy, whereas such clinics are offered for more 
common chronic conditions such as diabetes, so 
that care processes for the less common chronic 
diseases may not be routinely embedded in clini-
cal practice. The simultaneous removal from 
EMRs of pop-up reminders to opportunistically 
deliver care or document activity may also have 
contributed, particularly for aspects of incentiv-
ized care, such as giving health advice,25 which 
clinicians may value less than care for more es-
tablished chronic diseases. The introduction of 
the QOF was associated with the narrowing of 
quality differences between practices serving 
more affluent populations and those serving less 
affluent populations,26 but previous studies of 
incentive removal did not examine such dispari-
ties. Despite reductions in documented quality for 
all indicators, it is reassuring that socioeconomic 
disparities more often narrowed than widened 
after incentive removal.
The strengths of this study include the use of 
interrupted time-series analysis to examine in-
centive removal in routine care in approximately 
one third of all English practices, with a sensi-
tivity analysis that included all available data 
showing findings that were consistent with the 
primary analysis. A weakness is that the time 
series has relatively few data points, but this is 
inevitable with annual reporting. As with all ob-
servational studies, residual confounding cannot 
be excluded as an explanation for the observed 
changes in documented quality, although the 
stability of indicators for which incentives were 
maintained reduces the likelihood of residual 
confounding.
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The key limitation of the study is that on the 
basis of the available data, we cannot distinguish 
between changes in clinical activity and changes 
in documentation of clinical activity in the EMR. 
The four serious mental illness indicators pro-
vide the most direct test of this. The two indica-
tors for which incentives were maintained did not 
change (which is consistent with patients still 
being regularly reviewed by practices), but there 
were marked reductions in documentation of gly-
cated hemoglobin measurement (automatically 
imported to the EMR from the laboratory) and 
body-mass index (automatically calculated if 
weight is entered, although measurement of weight 
and other vital signs is not routine when pa-
tients visit primary care practices in the United 
Kingdom). These findings are consistent with a 
true change in clinical practice, although proof 
of a true change would require a detailed record 
review to examine whether care was still being 
delivered but was documented in free text rather 
than in the coded fields used for measurement. 
Our overall interpretation is that observed reduc-
tions in quality for core clinical care (e.g., blood-
pressure management, retinopathy screening, and 
laboratory measurements for processes and out-
comes) do reflect changes in clinical practice but 
that the much larger reductions in documenta-
tion of clinical advice and seizure-free status in 
patients with epilepsy should be more cautiously 
interpreted. For example, family doctors in the 
United Kingdom may now be giving less advice 
about long-acting, reversible contraception, may 
simply not be documenting that advice, or both. 
We know that the introduction of incentives to 
give advice was associated with increases in the 
use of long-acting contraceptives.27 What we need 
to know now is whether that increased use per-
sists once incentives to give advice are removed 
and, more broadly, whether any gains with the 
introduction of incentives are maintained or lost 
when those incentives are removed.
If pay for performance is to contribute widely 
to quality improvement, then it is inevitable that 
incentives will be removed from some indicators 
to allow resources for quality improvement to be 
redeployed.28 A key implication of this study is 
that although the effect of incentive removal prob-
ably depends on the context, reductions in qual-
ity are likely, and several studies show that what 
is gained on incentive introduction is essentially 
lost on incentive withdrawal. Therefore, at a 
minimum, payers planning to remove incentives 
should monitor the quality of care after removal. 
In doing so, they face the same conundrum in-
volved in introducing incentives: the uncertainty 
about whether changes in documented quality 
represent true changes in patient care. Options 
include using chart review or examining data 
that directly measure clinical practice, such as 
laboratory claims or prescribing data. However, 
collecting such data will add to the cost and 
potentially the viability of pay-for-performance 
programs. Better still, randomized removal of in-
centives or removal from some practices or indi-
vidual physicians would provide a more robust 
means of evaluating the effects of incentive re-
moval.29 More generally, such effects will be me-
diated by the wider context of quality improve-
ment, including public reporting, the underlying 
quality-of-care infrastructure, and other interven-
tions used alongside incentives to improve qual-
ity.8-11,18 Financial incentives that simply pay 
providers to deliver specified levels of quality 
therefore seem unlikely to deliver sustainable im-
provement unless they are aligned with more 
comprehensive interventions that change the or-
ganization of care and future clinical practice.8,10,11
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with 
the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
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